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so dictates.24 Furthermore, mere suspicions of improper actions, without
more, are not enough to require the imposition of Chapter X. 2 °
In the principal case, the court held that proceedings under Chapter XI
are not available to a debtor corporation with publicly held securities when
there is a need for a thorough reorganization of the corporation's capital
structure.2° Here, a composition of creditors, without more, would have
presented a substantial question of fairness to the debenture holders and, at
the same time, the financial history and condition of the debtor indicated
that the interests of the investing public, and those of the SEC, could not
be adequately represented under the Chapter XI proceedings.
It would appear then, that Chapter XI is available to large publicly
held corporations only when the debtor's plan proposes no more than a simple
composition of unsecured debts, when there is no reason to believe that
management has acted in bad faith or that it is incompetent, and when
priority rights of creditors are not jeopardized.
MICHAEL B. SPITZ
Conflict of Laws—Secured Transactions—LTCC.—Casterline v. General
Motors Acceptance Corp. 1—On October 14, 1957, a New York dealer sold
by conditional sale an automobile to Simon and the same day assigned the
contract to appellant General Motors Acceptance Corporation. Within two
days the automobile passed through a succession of purchasers and lastly
was sold to a Pennsylvania purchaser for value in Wilkes-Barre. 2 The
original vendor filed his conditional sales contract in the registry of Bronx
County, New York, on October 21. No payments on the contract having
been made by December, the appellant repossessed the vehicle. From an
adverse decision in his action of replevin, the plaintiff appealed to the
Superior Court of Pennsylvania. HELD: The vendor's interest is prior to
that of the purchaser.
The problem is the interplay of the provisions of the Uniform Condi-
tional Sales Act with those of the Uniform Commercial Code as applied by
Pennsylvania. New York law, which governs the original sale, provides that
the seller's rights reserved by conditional sale are void as to any bona fide
purchaser for value without notice unless the contract or copy is filed in
the appropriate filing district within ten days after the sale.° New York
does not have a title certificate law. In contrast, the Pennsylvania condi-
tional vendor must note his encumbrance on the certificate of title to
"perfect" his interest under the Code Section 9-302(3) (b) in conjunction
with the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code. 4
24 SEC v. Wilcox-Gay Corp., supra note 23.
25 6 Collier, Bankruptcy § 0.11 (1940), In re Transvision, supra note 22.
25 Supra note 1, at 791.
1 171 A.2d 813 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1961).
2 The ultimate purchaser was refunded the purchase price by his seller, the
plaintiff Casterline, and was not involved in the litigation. The court attached no
significance to the fact that Castedine was a dealer.
3 N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 65.
4 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12A § 9-302(3)(bb), and tit. 75 §¢ 31-42.
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The conflict of laws rules of the Code provide that a security interest
which has attached to personal property according to the law of the situs,
before its removal into the state, will be considered perfected in Pennsyl-
vania for four months after entry if the interest was already perfected in
the jurisdiction wherein the interest had attached. 5
 The court decided
that the New York filing statute was par% materia with the Code's per-
fection prerequisite, hence compliance with New York law should afford
the New York vendor the same protection in this case as is given the Penn-
sylvania holder of an interest perfected under the Code. It further decided
that a New York security interest is perfected at once when the contract
is made subject to losing its priority if the contract is not filed in time.
Most courts recognize that a security interest in a chattel, properly
attached and duly recorded according to the law of the state wherein the
interest was created and the chattel then located, will, if valid in such state,
be valid against subsequent purchasers and creditors in the state to which
the property is removed, if such removal is without the knowledge or consent
of the interest holder. 6
 Just as the owner of stolen property can follow the
6
 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12A § 9-103(3). The present version presents an interesting
improvement in the wording of the Code. The 1958 Official Text provides in § 9-103:
(3) If personal property other than that governed by subsections (1) and (2)
is already subject to a security interest when it is brought into this state, the
validity of the security interest in this state is to be determined by the law
(including the conflict of laws rules) of the jurisdiction where the property was
when the security interest attached. However, if the parties to the transaction
understood at the time that the security interest attached that the property
would be kept in this state and it was brought into this state within 30
days after the security interest attached for purposes other than transportation
through this state, then the validity of the security interest is to be determined
by the law of this state. If the security interest was already perfected under
the law of the jurisdiction where the property was when the security interest
attached and before being brought into this state, the security interest
continues perfected in this state for four months and also thereafter if within
the four month period it is perfected in this state. The security interest may
also be perfected in this state after the expiration of the four month period;
in such case perfection dates from the time of perfection in this state. If
the security interest was not perfected under the law of the jurisdiction where
the property was when the security interest attached and before being brought
into this state, it may be perfected in this state; in such case perfection dates
from the time of perfection in this state.
The earlier draft, enacted by Pennsylvania and applicable in the principal case, provided:
(3) . . . If the security interest was already perfected under the law of the
jurisdiction where the property was kept before being brought into the state,
the security interest continues perfected here for four months and also thereafter
if within the four month period it is perfected here. .. . If the security interest
was not perfected under the law of the jurisdiction where the property was kept
before being brought into the state, it may be perfected here; in such case per-
fection dates from the time of perfection in this state.
By amendment of October 2, 1959, P.L. 1023, § 9, Pennsylvania adopted the improved
draft.
6 Ragner v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 66 Ariz. 157, 185 P.2d 525 (1947);
Chetopa State Bank v. Manes, 221 Ark. 784, 255 5.W.2d 957 (1953); Atha v. Docklus,
39 Ca1.2(1 635, 248 P.2d 745 (1952) ; Morris Plan Bank v. Terrell, 4 Del. (5 Terry) 533,
62 A.2d 452 (1948); Continental National Bank v. Short, 101 Ga. App. 304, 113 S.E.2d
491 (1960); First National Bank v. Lowery, 17 III. App. 2d 288, 149 N.E.2d 660 (1958);
American Loan Co. v. See, 298 Ky. 180, 182 S.W.2d 644 (1944); Wisdom v. Keithley,
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thief across state lines and assert his title against innocent purchasers on
the theory that he who has no title can give no title, so also may the
conditional vendor of an automobile removed wrongfully to another state
assert his rights successfully in the courts of at least forty-four states.?
Comity and the practical necessity for uniform law dictates this concurrence.
Section 9403(3) of the Commercial Code then is but a codification of this
general proposition.
The enactment of certificate of title statutes, however, created a trouble- •
some fissure in the structure of commercial law. Whereas certificates of title
were at one time a tax and police expedient, the states began to require such
certificates as muniments of title. 8
 While the document was intended pri-
marily as an anti-theft device, 8
 its requirement as an indication of all
ownership rights was a logical legislative second step. The mobility of the
subject matter had rendered inadequate the doubtful notice afforded by
the chattel mortgage recordation acts.
Unhappily, the enactment of these laws has been a patchwork affair;
the conflict of laws problems have been acute. A number of states have
required certificates as conclusive muniments of title.'° In such a jurisdic-
tion, the importer of a vehicle from a state without such a statute may be
allowed to perpetrate a fraud on the foreign owner. Before enactment of
the Code,"- Ohio decided that under a statute making acquisition of title
hinge on issuance of a title certificate, the court cannot recognize any owner-
ship interest in an automobile except as such interest is evidenced by a
certificate of title issued in accordance with Ohio law. 12
 The culprit had
removed the vehicle from California to Vermont where no title papers are
issued and thence to Ohio. Whatever steps the foreign conditional vendor
may have taken at the situs of the contract, and whatever the effect of
such precautions there, the clear legislative imperative, said the court, could
not be avoided. Similarly, Florida's statute was held to thwart the innocent
foreign secured party because the formalities of Florida Jaw had not been
observed.13
 But statutes which deliberately fly in the face of comity are
rare; the common problem is of more subtle origin.
Eleven states do not have certificate of title laws. 14
 When an auto-
237 Mo. App. 76, 167 S.W.2d 450 (1943); West v. Associates Discount Corp., 206 Okla.
44, 240 P.2d 1077 (1952); Lillard v. Yellow Mfg. Accept, Corp., 195 Tenn. 686, 263
S.W.2d 520 (1953); Mosko v. Smith, 63 Wyo. 239, 179 P.2d 781 (1947).
7
 National Bond & Inv. Co. v. Larsh, 262 III. App. 360 (1931).
8 Alabama, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Hamp-
shire, New York, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Vermont do not have certificate
of title laws.
9
 The Uniform Motor Vehicle Anti-theft Act was adopted in 1926 by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. This act provided for notation
of encumbrances on the title certificate. The act was withdrawn in 1943 and has been
replaced on the recommended list by the Uniform Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title
and Anti-theft act.
10
 Florida, Nebraska, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas.
II Ohio Laws of 1961, S.B. 5 (effective July 1, 1962).
12
 Kelley Kar Co. v. Finkler, 155 Ohio St. 541, 99 N.E.2d 665 (1951).
13
 Lee v. Bank of Georgia, 159 Fla. 481, 32 So.2d 7 (1947).
14 Supra. nate 8.
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mobile passes from a certificate state such as Pennsylvania into New York
the buyer is apprised of the state of title by the statutory certificate
notations, if any. Most states require the surrender of foreign certificates
either as a matter of comity, or by statute." Even though succeeding pur-
chasers may have no notice of an infirmity of title, the favorable position of
the initial transferee gives New York purchasers a considerable advantage.
When an encumbered vehicle enters a title certificate state from New
York, the buyer, as a practical matter, must rely on the integrity of the
man with whom he deals." In this respect then, Pennsylvania, through its
Code Section 9-103(3), has subjected its citizens to the hazards of inter-
state trafficking, while at the same time it gives full benefit of antiquated
foreign recordation acts to citizens of those states whose failure to enact
title certificate laws has created those hazards.
But in at least one important area, the Code operates to improve the
position of the domestic buyer. The purchaser from a dealer who himself is
the mortgagor enjoys new protection. Section 9-307 provides that whether
the security interest is or is not protected at home or abroad,
a buyer in the ordinary course of business other than a person
buying farm products from a person engaged in farming opera-
tions takes free of a security interest created by his seller even
though the buyer knows of its existence.
Section 1-201(9) defines a buyer in the ordinary course of business as
. . . a person who in good faith and without knowledge that the
sale to him is in violation of the ownership rights or the security
interest of the third party buys in the ordinary course from a
person in the business of selling goods of that kind but does not
include a pawnbroker.
The net effect of these provisions is that a buyer on a used car lot
takes subject to encumbrances created by the dealer only if he has actual
knowledge that the sale is in violation of that security agreement." In the
ordinary course of the automobile business actual knowledge by the pur-
chaser is not very likely if the dealer wishes to conceal the facts. Most
statutes that require a transfer of title certificate to pass title, exempt
transactions by dealers." Further, title transfer laws may not apply to
vehicles coming from out of state. Lastly, it is not uncommon for a dealer
to complete the paper work of the transaction for the buyer as a business
is Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-303 (1956); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 75-134 (1960); Ga. Code
Ann. § 68-408a (Supp. 1961) ; Ind. Stat. Ann. § 47-2501 (Supp. 1961); Iowa Code Ann.
§ 321.23 (Supp. 1960) ; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 186.020 (1955); La. Rev. Stat. § 32.707
(Supp. 1960) ; Mich, Comp. Laws § 257.218 (1948) ; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-106 (1952).
10 See supra note 6.
17 Section 1-201(25) provides:
. . . A person "knows" or has "knowledge" of a fact when he has actual knowl-
edge of it.
18
 Ark. Stat. Ann. § 75-150 (1959); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-6-18 (1953); Conn.
Gen. Stat. Rev. § 14-166 (1958); Idaho Code Ann. § 49-403 (Supp. 1961); Kans. Gen.
Stat. § 81-135 (Supp. 1959); La. Rev. Stat. § 32-705 (Supp. 1960); Mich. Camp. Laws
§ 257.235 (1948); Wis. Stat. § 342.18 (1957).
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courtesy. Hence, the vendee would have no occasion to see a tell-tale foreign
certificate, should one exist.
The foreign secured party fares better elsewhere than in a Code state
in this situation. In Bank of Atlanta v. Fretz," the same trio appear: an
innocent foreign mortgagee with an interest perfected in the state of origin,
a dealer who has wrongfully removed and wrongfully sold the automobile,
and an unsuspecting purchaser. The court held that the mortgagee should
prevail since he had taken all reasonable steps. In short, mere possession
by the dealer is not enough.2° The owner must be charged with some over-
sight or imprudence for the purchaser to prevail. Estoppel can operate only
against a party in whom there is some legal fault. Most courts have been
willing to cut off the security interest if, in addition to possession by the
dealer, other circumstances converge to justify the penalty, such as the leav-
ing of documents, indicia of ownership, in improper hands. The Code makes
short work of these distinctions: all interests created by the dealer are cut
off by a good faith purchase. 2 '
PAUL G. DELANEY
Corporations—Derivative Suits—Security for Expenses under Rule
X-10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Commission.—McClure v. Borne
Chemical Co.'—Plaintiffs, stockholders in Borne Chemical Co., brought a
10 148 Tex. 551, 226 S.W.2d 843 (1950). The case is cited with approval by the
court in the principal case, but with no comment upon the fact that resale was by a
dealer.
20 The mortgagee who has left encumbered goods with the mortgagor engaged in
the sale of such goods may well be deprived of his rights as against an innocent pur-
chaser on theories of agency, waiver, or estoppel. But the law chose not to make this an
absolute proposition. Possession alone is inconclusive. "The law takes into account not
simply the deception of the subsequent buyer by the appearance of title in the possessor
of the goods, but also whether this appearance of title was created by the original owner
for a purpose so essential and proper that the original title must be protected irrespective
of the injury to the subsequent buyer." 2 Williston, Sales § 312 (rev. ed. 1948).
Mod v. Chicago National Bank, 3 III. App.2d 49, 120 N.E.2d 567 (1954); Rand's
Discount Co, v. Universal C.I.T. Corp., 10 App. Div.2d 240, 198 N.Y.S.2d 341 (1960).
The classic case of the watch left for repairs with a jeweler typifies this principle.
Zendman v. Harry Winston, Inc., 305 N.Y. 180, 111 N.E.2d 871 (1953). The rule is no
less applicable to automobile cases. Budget Plan inc. v. Savoy, 336 Mass. 322, 145
N.E.2d 710 (1957).
See also the Uniform Sales Act, 1 U.L.A. § 23(1); Uniform Conditional Sales Act,
2 U.L.A. § 9 (Supp. 1960) ; Uniform Trust Receipts Act, 9A U.L.A. § 9 (1951). These
laws all manifest particular concern for the innocent purchaser. Yet all accept the
premise that mere possession by the dealer is not enough. On the other hand, case
law has been said to have eroded the common law principle through a particular find-
ing of negligence by the mortgagee. First National Bank v. Hermann, 275 App. Div.
415, 90 N.Y.S.2d 249 (1949).
21 In
 a somewhat similar situation the Code again completely abrogates the old
principle. Section 2-403(2) states: "Any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant
who deals in goods of that kind gives him power to transfer all rights of the entruster
to a buyer in the ordinary course of business."
The voidable title doctrine, as codified in § 2-403(1), has not yet been extended to
conditional sales. See, generally, 49 Ky. L.J. 437 (1961).
1 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1961).
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